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Abstract  
In May 2017, Jokowi’s administration announced the intention to dissolve 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). HTI is an Islamic organization that aspires to 
establish caliphate government based on the claim of Islamic teaching. The 
Government considers HTI as a threat to Pancasila. The announcement has created 
controversy. It has divided Indonesian into pro and contra camp. The dissolution 
pro camp argues HTI ideology is against Pancasila, Indonesia political ideology. 
Furthermore, they pointed out HTI’s idea of Caliphate that based on religion 
would disintegrate the nation. Conversely, the cons argues the government move 
is against the constitutionally guarantee freedom of association as stipulates in the 
1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (hereafter the 1945 Constitution). 
The move would create precedent that threatens freedom of assembly if the 
government failed to enact due process procedure and provide justifiable reason 
for the action. This controversy is not new to human rights and democratic 
discourse. Karl Popper describes the debate as a paradox of tolerance, democracy, 
and freedom in an open society. This paper examines how the 1945 Constitution 
can be utilized to resolve the paradox. This paper argues that Article 28 J par.2 
of the 1945 Constitution requires the balance between human rights protection 
and limitation in its proportion. Thus, the limitation clause should be used as 
a parameter to solve HTI issue. This paper explores the use of proportionality 
test in interpreting the limitation clause and applies it not only to the question 
of HTI issue but also broader issues to evaluate recent government moves in 
amending the Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation. This paper 
employs a doctrinal method in its analysis. 
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Less well known is the paradox of tolerance: Unlimited tolerance must lead 
to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even 
to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant 
society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be 
destroyed, and tolerance with them (Karl Popper)1
I. INTRODUCTION  
The quotation above describes paradox between maintaining open/free 
society against the tendency to protect openness by adopting ways that against 
the principle of open society. Popper defines open society as a society in which 
a person allows to base their decision on the authority of their intelligence. 
Conversely, closed society is a society that still believes in magical taboo. Thus, 
individual in closed society take their decision based on authority outside of 
themselves.2 The closed society disallows individuals to think freely and to accept 
every aspect of life as it is, including government policy. Popper equates this 
type of society with a totalitarian regime.3 In a political context, an open society 
allows citizen or individual to evaluate the consequence of government policies 
critically. The open society protects the right to criticize, and the difference 
between people on societal policy will be resolved by critical discussion and 
argument rather by force. In short, open society refers to liberal and democratic 
society, whereas the closed society relates to the totalitarian society.  
The open society embraces rights and freedom of the individual as the 
fundamental basis of its community. The freedom than formalizes and guarantees 
through a constitution with the adoption of human rights. The human rights 
operate within a legal system that embraced the rule of law. The guarantee of 
freedom creates a paradox when facing with person or organization that wants 
to destroy the freedom itself. 
Indonesia as a young democratic country is also facing similar paradox. This 
paradox manifests in the existence of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (hereafter, HTI) 
1 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Frome & London: Buttler & Tanner Ltd, 1945), 226.
2 Ibid.
3  Blackburn S, “The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy : Open Society/Closed Society", (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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movement. HTI is a part of a larger transnational Islamic movement of Hizbut 
Tahrir4 that advocates the establishment of a caliphate as a form of government. 
Caliphate model of government is a world imperium government that governs 
and applies sharia laws. HTI rejects democracy and the nation-state in favor of 
caliphate system of government.5
In May 2017, Indonesian’s government stated that they would dissolve and 
prohibit HTI to operate in Indonesia. The government cited three reasons for 
their decision: first, HTI as a societal organization has not contributed positively 
to the development of society. Second, there is a strong indication HTI’s activities 
are against with the goals, principles, and character of Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution as stipulated in the Societal Organisation Law. Finally, HTI’s activities 
have created friction and brought threat to public order and security as well 
as jeopardizing the national unity. The HTI dissolution possesses similar to a 
paradox as describes by Karl Popper. The question rests in the limit of how far a 
democratic government can use coercion to suppress closed ideology proponents. 
This paper focuses on the utilization of the limitation clause in the 1945 
Constitution to resolve the paradox. This paper argues that the paradox of 
tolerance can be resolved by applying a proportionality test in the interpretation 
of the limitation clause. The argument is based on the proposition that the 
government have the power to limit freedom of assembly under the limitation 
clause. The proportionality test requires government in exercising its power to 
limit freedom of association should be proportional to the threat posed by the 
organisation in question. Thus, the government measures in limiting freedom 
of association should be constructed in the spectrum of sanctions, starting from 
minor sanction such as notification of the breach, revoking grants, limiting 
organisation activities, administrative supervision, to the ultimate sanction, the 
dissolution.
It employs doctrinal analysis. The analysis focuses mainly on the interpretation 
of the primary source of laws that consists of laws and judicial decisions. 
4 In this paper the term of HTI as Indonesia chapter and HT as the transnational affiliation of HTI is used 
interchangeably.  
5 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “The Quest for Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia”, Asian Journal of Social Science 37 (2009) : 631 - 632
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Additionally, it also analyses secondary source, namely, scholarly journal articles, 
government reports, and other government official report. Thus, this paper gives 
systematic exposition to the interpretation of the limitation clause based on 
proportionality test.6 The aim is to give systematic understanding on the use of 
the proportionality test in interpreting the limitation clause and how it can be 
used to solve HTI issue without violating the principle of open society. 
This paper consists of five sections. The first section is the introduction that 
discusses the background and context of HTI dissolution. The second section 
examines the relevant conceptual, political and historical context of Pancasila and 
HTI’s Caliphate ideology. The third section elaborates the incompatibility between 
Pancasila and HTI’s Caliphate ideology. The forth section discusses government 
reasons for dissolving HTI. The fifth section elaborates the idea of applying the 
proportionality test to the limitation clause in Indonesia constitutional context. 
Finally, the sixth section summarizes the paper and provides recommendations. 
II. PANCASILA AND CALIPHATE IDEOLOGY  
This section describes the foundational idea of Pancasila and HTI’s Caliphate 
Ideology. Some important historical and philosophical elements of both ideologies 
are highlighted. Additionally, this section summarizes each key fundamental 
character of both ideologies.  
2.1. Pancasila, the “Imagined Order”, that Unites Indonesia
Pancasila is Indonesia state ideology that was proclaimed by Soekarno 
on 1 June 1945. Soekarno introduced Pancasila in his speech in front 
of “Investigative Body for the Preparation of Independent of Indonesia” 
(Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia hereafter, 
BPUPKI).7 BPUPKI convened between 29 May 1945 – 17July 1945. In the first 
session of BPUPKI, Soekarno suggested five basic principles that should 
6 Paul Chynoweth, “Legal Research” in Advance Research Methods in the Built Environment, ed. Andrew Knight 
and Less Ruddock (Chichester: Willey-Blackwell, 2008), 30   
7 Saafroedin Bahar, et.al., eds., Risalah Sidang Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia 
[Minutes of Meeting of Indonesia Independence Attempt Investigation Agency], (Jakarta: Indonesia State Secretariat, 
1995),  389.
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become the foundation (weltanschauung) of the Republic of Indonesia to be. 
They are (1) Indonesian nationalism; (2) internationalism-humanitarianism; 
(3) unanimous consensus-democracy, (4) societal welfare; and (5) belief 
in one god. Subsequently, BPUPKI established a small committee (panitia 
kecil) to discuss further related to Soekarno’s five principles proposal. The 
committee consisted of nine members of BPUPKI, namely, Abikoesno 
Tjokrosoejoso, Kiai Haji Wachid Hasjim, Mr. Muh. Yamin, Soebardjo, Tuan 
Maramis, Kiai Abd. Kahar Moezakir, Drs. Mohammad Hatta, Hadji Agoes 
Salim, and Soekarno, himself.8 The small committee reported their work in 
the 2nd session of BPUPKI. The small committee produced a constitution 
draft. In the process, the small committee reformulated Soekarno’s five 
principles.9 In the final formulation, BPUPKI agreed to a final version that 
stipulates : belief in one God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa), a justice and 
civilized humanitarianism (Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab), the unity 
of Indonesia (Persatuan Indonesia), the people governed by wise policies 
through a process of consultation and consensus (Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin 
oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan dalam Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan) and social 
justice for all the Indonesian people (Keadilan Sosial bagi Seluruh Rakyat 
Indonesia).
There are three important aspects of Pancasila related to HTI’s issues. 
First, Pancasila has been used to fend off Islamic political aspiration. Second, 
Pancasila aims to unify diverse religions, ethnics, and race within nation 
state framework. Finally, Pancasila is an ideology that put sovereignty to 
the people. 
Since its inception, Pancasila has been designed and used to fend off the 
formalization of Islam into Indonesia state. This conclusion can be found 
from close reading to the debate between secular camp with political Islam 
camp on the discussion of the first pillar of Pancasila, the belief in one God. 
The interpretation of the first pillar has always become a contentious debate 
8 Ibid, 94.
9 Ibid, 86.
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between Indonesia secular political groups and Islamic political aspiration. 
The principle of one God is a fundamental proclamation to the religious 
characteristic of Indonesia. Initially, the principle of belief in one God comes 
with the stipulation of obligation of sharia law for its adherents (Muslim). 
The stipulation is known as “the seven words” of Jakarta Charter (hereafter, 
the seven words). The reformulation of belief one God principle that included 
the seven words had invited opposition from non-Muslim camp. On 11 July 
1945, Latuharhary, a prominent non-Muslim leader from Ambon, eastern 
of Indonesia, objected the stipulation of the seven words.10 The reason for 
his objection was that sharia law potentially created domination to other 
laws, especially adat law (customary law). Latuharhary elaborates that the 
stipulation could potentially create conflict between Muslim and Christian in 
Ambon. He explained in Ambon, Muslims and Christian often come from the 
same family. The seven words created a problem when amongst member of 
family with different religion try to split the inheritance property. If Muslim 
used sharia law, it would be refused by their brother of other faith. 
Consequently, it potentially creates conflict between them. In addition, 
the so-called secular Muslim camp also rejected the seven words stipulation. 
For instance, Wongsonegoro and Hosein Djadjadiningrat pointed out the 
possibility of creating a religious fanaticism.11 Another objection from non-
Muslim is the potential discrimination that might pose to all minority groups. 
In the heat of debate, the non-Muslim threatened not to join the Republic 
of Indonesia if the seven words remain. The result of this debate was the 
elimination of the wording of the seven words as the first pillar of Pancasila 
and in the Constitutional Preamble. Mohammad Hatta played a substantial 
role in the omission of the seven words. In private meeting with Ki Bagus 
Hadikusumo, Wahid Hasjim, Kasman Singodimedjo and Teuku Hasan, 
Hatta convinced them to discard the clause in favour of the unity of a new 
10 Faisal Ismail, “Islam, Politics and Ideology in Indonesia: A study of The Process of Muslim Acceptance of The 
Pancasila” (Ph.D. diss, McGill University, 1995), 53, http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_
id=39924&local_base=GEN01-MCG02.
11 Ibid. 
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nation that they try to establish.12 In Hatta’s memoirs, he said that one of 
the Japanese officers delivered a message from his counterpart in eastern 
part of Indonesia, saying majority of the people refused to join the state to 
be, if the seven word remain in the constitution.13
For some political Islam proponents, despite the disappearance of explicit 
stipulation on sharia obligation for Muslim, the acknowledgment of one 
God still perceived as an ideological justification for implementing sharia 
in Indonesia.14 Throughout history, the above context has overshadowed 
relation between political Islam in Indonesia that advocates the complete 
formalization of sharia and their secular-nationalist opponent that rejected 
any notion of Islamic morality incorporation to the state, both formally and 
informally. After 1945, there were several attempts from political Islam camp 
to incorporate sharia into Indonesia legal system. In 1950’s, the political Islam 
proponents tried to formalize through “Konstituante”. Konstituante is an 
ad hoc organ to formulate definitive constitution to replace the Temporary 
Constitution of 1950 (“Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara 1950”). Soekarno 
ended this venture with Presidential Decree of 1959. 
In the early Soeharto era, the confrontation between Pancasila’s 
secular camp and Islamic politic aspiration was high.15 One of the notable 
controversies was the application Pancasila as “single principle” (asas tunggal) 
to be adopted by all societal organisation in Indonesia. The application 
of a single principle in societal organisation policy preceded with the 
People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat hereafter, 
MPR) Decree Number II/MPR/1978 on Guideline on Comprehension and 
Implementation of Pancasila (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan 
Pancasila [Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa]). The Decree gave an interpretation on 
the meaning of Pancasila. It affirms the exclusion of political Islam aspiration 
for sharia law in its interpretation of the belief in one God principles. It 
12 Ibid., 54.
13 Mohammad Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi [On The Proclamation], (Jakarta: Tintamas), 1970.
14 See Ismatu Ropi, Religion and Regulation in Indonesia, (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 89.     
15 Jamie Mackie, “Patrimonialism: The New Order and Beyond” in Soeharto’s New Order and its Legacy Essays in 
honour of Harold Crouch 2, ed. Edward Aspinall (Canbera: Australian Univesity Press, 2010), 81.
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also interprets Pancasila’s first principle as to guarantee freedom of religion, 
non-compulsion in the exercise of religion, and emphasize the cooperation 
among the religious group to obtain harmony in the society.16 The emphasizes 
on the freedom of religion, and non-compulsion in the practice of religion 
is in direct contradiction to political Islam aspiration. 
After the Suharto down fall, political Islam once again attempted to 
formalize sharia during the amendment of Constitution in 2000 – 2010. The 
aspiration was to return the seven words in to Pancasila, the Constitutional 
Preamble and Article 29 of the Constitution. This venture also met with 
failure.17 The second aspect is the status Pancasila as Indonesian “imagined 
order.” Youval Harari defines imagined order as a myth that created to 
enable people to cooperate or united in a polity. The imagined order is 
shared among people within the polity that believe in certain idea/ideology.18 
Pancasila as an ideology has been successful to become the imagined order 
of Indonesian people. It becomes the unifying narrative for millions of 
Indonesian people to work together within a polity of Indonesia state. There 
are several reasons for Pancasila success in function as imagined order: 
first, the success is due to vigorous Pancasila proponents in campaigning 
it.19 They staunchly defended Pancasila as the means of ensuring mutual 
tolerance and freedom of belief to maintain national unity. The efforts 
were sustained by intellectual environment and the  bureaucracy.20 One of 
the key successes of Pancasila as unifying narrative was the description of 
Pancasila as indigenous ideology derived from the essence of Indonesian 
people as opposed to the imported foreign ideology of those western or in 
HTI context as Arab’s ideology. Secondly, Pancasila is a consensus ideology, 
in which elements of Indonesia nation come to agree to overcome differences. 
16  MPR Decision Number II/MPR/1978 on the Guideline on The Observant and Implementation of Pancasila (Republic 
of Indonesia)
17  Denny Indrayana, Indonesia Constitutional Reform 1999 - 2002 : An Evaluation of Constitution-Making in Transition, 
(Jakarta: Kompas, 2008), 183.
18  See Yuval Harari. Sapiens A Brief History of Humankind,  (London : Vintage Books, 2014).  
19 R.E. Nelson, “Nationalism, Islam, ‘secularism’ and the state in Contemporary Indonesia, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 64, No.3 (2010) : 329.
20 Ibid.
Proportionality Test in the 1945 Constitution: Limiting Hizbut Tahrir Freedom of Assembly
Constitutional Review, May 2018, Volume 4, Number 1 53
Furthermore, they also agreed to unite under Pancasila banner. The idea 
of Pancasila as unifying ideology is apparent in the phrase of “Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika” (unity in diversity). This motto has been an essential part 
of the national emblem (Garuda Pancasila). Many Indonesian, especially 
non-Muslim and secular Indonesian, sees Pancasila as unifying narrative 
because of its success in overcome the narrative of the Islamic group. As 
a majority group in Indonesia, some Muslims element demanded that the 
foundation of the state-to-be is Islam. However, the aspiration had been 
staunchly rejected by secular Muslim and eastern Christian groups, notably, 
Latuharhary. In the deliberation process, three issues discussed extensively 
in rejecting Islamic political aspiration, starting from trivial issues such as 
the title of the preamble of the constitution, in which the Islam politician 
suggested Arabic word of “Mukaddimah” that rejected by the secular camp 
that prefer a native language of “Pembukaan.”21 
The much substantive debate was on the seven word of sharia application 
for Muslim that resulted in the removing the seven word from the first 
pillars and Article 29 of the Constitution of 1945. Another important 
element of non-Muslim rejection toward political Islam aspiration is that 
the requirement of the President must be Muslim. The stipulation was 
rejected not only by the Christian elements but also secular muslim citing 
discrimination to non-Muslim as rejection.22 Another important aspect of 
Pancasila that relevant to the discussion is the narrative of Pancasila was 
framed within nation state and nationalism. It rejects internationalism and 
cosmopolitanism that challenged nation state border. Sukarno emphasizes 
this in his famous speech of 1 June 1945 that the goal of BPUPKI meeting 
is to establish a nation state country based on nationalism (kebangsaan). 
Borrowing from the famous French historian, Ernest Renan, definition of a 
nation, Sukarno defined a nation as the unity of people based on the share 
of fate.23 Sukarno also attacked Liem Koen Hian that rejected nationalism 
21 Ismail Faisal, Islam, Politic, 55.
22 Ibid., 245.  
23 Saafroedin Bahar, et.al., eds., Risalah Sidang, 71. 
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in favour of cosmopolitanism.24 Finally, Pancasila put people as the centre 
of its legitimacy. People are sovereign, in which government must be elected 
and accountable to the people. The people sovereignty was embodied in 
MPR, in which all of the state organs must answer to MPR.25 In conclusion, 
it can be said that the acceptance of Pancasila as Indonesian ideology, 
especially for those of non-Muslim majority in eastern part of Indonesia 
was primary due to guarantee of equality and non-discrimination from the 
majority (Muslim). After seeing the BPUPKI and PPKI deliberation, it can 
be concluded that Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945 were designed to 
deliver such promises. Failed to deliver the equality and non-discrimination 
promise would mean disintegration to the nation. 
2.2. HTI’s Goal to Create Islamic Imperium
HTI‘s ideology is based on the idea of Taqiyuddin an Nabhani. An 
Nabhani is a Palestinian born cleric. He was born in 1909 from Ottoman’s 
judge’s father and Islamic scholar mother. An Nabhani family background 
came from long line of Ottoman judicial officers and prominent figures in 
the Ottoman caliphate. An Nabhani grandfather was a prominent judge in 
the Ottoman state that oversaw judicial matters in Palestine.26 An Nabhani 
background potentially impacted profoundly on his preference to Caliphate 
model of government, where other Islamist ideology are still willing to fight 
their cause (the application of sharia) within the nation state framework.27 An 
Nabhani produced a substantial number of books that cover topics related 
to Islam politics and way of life. One of his greatest works is Al-Shakhsiyya 
al-Islamiyah that consisted of three volumes on Islamic jurisprudence.28 
Nonetheless, the most important book related to the idea of HTI’s 
Islamic state and its ideology can be found in Dawlyah al-Islamiyah (The 
24 Ibid., 75.
25 Article 1 Pre-Amendment Constitution of 1945. 
26 “Sheikh Muhammad Taqiuddin al-Nabhani”, Hizb Ut Tahrir Australia, accessed March 20, 2018 http://www.hizb-
australia.org/2016/02/sheikh-muhammad-taqiuddin-al-nabhani/,
27 See Noman Hanif, “Hizb ut Tahrir : Islam’s Ideological Vanguard”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 39, 
No.2 (2012) : 201-225  
28 Ibid.
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Islamic State), Muqimat al-Dustor (Introduction to the Constitution), and 
Mahafeem Hizb Ut-Tahrir (Concepts of Hizbut-Tahrir). HTI political goal is 
to implement An Nabhani idea of an Islamic imperium under a Caliphate 
leadership. HT ideology importation to Indonesia came with the arrival of 
Australian-Palestinian, Abdurrahman Al-Baghadi, to Bogor, West Java in 
1982. Subsequently, Al-Baghadi managed to spread HT idea to the nearby 
prominent public university, Bogor Agriculture Institute (Institut Pertanian 
Bogor, IPB).29 From there, HT spreads to other campuses via campus religious 
unit and established networks that led to the formation of Indonesian chapter 
of HT (HTI).30 One of the distinct characters of HTI’s ideology from other 
Islamist ideology is the transnational character of its movement.31 HTI aims 
to establish an ummah (single political, economic, and societal society) that 
unified all Muslim majority countries in the world. In dawlah al-Islamiyah, 
An Nabhani asserts “the point at hand is not establishing several states, but 
one single state over the entire world”.32
Burhan Muhtadi summarizes three ideological cores of HTI. First, HTI 
advocates the re-establishment of a Global Caliphate and sharia. Second, HTI 
also advocates the idea of Islamic State under God’s sovereignty. Finally, HTI 
advocates global world order through caliphate.33 The Global caliphate is a 
political-religious state comprising Muslim community and other non-Muslim 
community under its dominion. The caliphate system is a system that aspire 
transnational Islamic government under one leadership (the caliphate). As a 
global imperium, caliphate rejected nation-state and nationalism that they 
considered as asabiya (segregate/disunity).34 The second HTI ideological 
core is God’s sovereignty. For HTI, the caliphate does not produce any 
law. The caliphate or government is simply adopting and implementing 
ahkaam shari’iyyah (the divine rules).35 Consequently, HTI does not accept 
29 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, The Quest, 626.
30 Ibid.
31 Noman Hanif, Hizb ut Tahrir, 206. 
32 Taqiuddin an-Nabhani [English Translation], The Islamic State (London: Al-Khalifah Publications, 1998), 2.  
33 Ibid., 629-634.
34 Ibid., 633.
35 Hizb ut-Tahrir, “The Draft Constitution of the Khilafah State, accessed March 3, 2018 http://www.hizb.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Draft-Constitution.pdf, Article 3.
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democracy since the creation of law in democracy is based on the will of 
people. Although in its constitutional structure HTI adopted parliamentary 
institution (Majlis ul-Ummah) similar to those of parliamentary democracy 
and its members are elected by people, the institution only has the power to 
check Caliphate in the form of consultation, without to pass legislation.36 The 
power to implement legislation is under the Caliphate, in which theoretically 
only adopt the divine rule.37 The idea operates on the proposition that the 
sovereignty to pass law belongs to yamlik al-iradah (the highest will). Sharia 
is the embodiment of the highest will that cannot be decided on majority 
and minority opinion, it should be grounded upon legal texts (Quran and 
Sunnah), since God, not the people who created law.38
The third ideological core of HTI is against nation state and nationalism. 
HTI considers nation state and nationalism as one of the major obstacles to 
the party’s attempt at the establishment of the Caliphate. HTI considered 
nationalism as “modern jahiliyah”. Jahiliyah is a concept in describing era 
before the time of Prophet Mohammad. The jahiliyah era or the ignorant 
era is associated with corruption and moral decay. In political aspect, one 
feature that characterizes jahiliyah era is asabiya, where the Arab pre-Islamic 
society was bound by their primordial tie. One of the Prophet Muhammad 
mission was to unify those fragmented society in one Ummah that overcome 
race, ethnic, cultural, and geographic affiliation. For HTI, nationalism and 
nation state is jahil because it brings back asabiya into Muslim community, 
especially, tribal fanaticism based on geographical affiliation.39
Finally, the most important aspect of the HTI’s ideology for this paper is 
the HTI’s strategy in advancing its cause. The strategy aspect is important to 
determine the government measure in limiting HTI’s freedom of assembly. 
Muhtadi outlines three stages of HTI’s strategy in establishing Caliphate: 
culturing stage (marhalah al-tathqif), interaction stage (marhalah tafa’ul 
36 Ibid., Article 101 – 107.
37 Ibid., Article 35.
38 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, The Quest, 632.
39 Ibid.
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ma’a al-naas), and revolution (istislam al-hukmi).40 The culturing stage is 
an initial stage in where HTI activist educates a large section of Muslim 
society by various means. At this stage, HTI actively focuses on recruiting 
and fostering ideological character of its cadres.41 On the second stage, HTI 
expands the movement to interact with other elements of society, especially, 
of those public officials and state apparatus. Muhtadi describes in this stage 
HTI members will infiltrate key political institutions, and military/security 
officers and provoke them to conduct a revolution. Finally, the last stage 
is to create a momentum, to do actual revolution, in which non-Caliphate 
regimes are toppled.42
In Indonesia, there are compelling evidence that at this stage HTI has 
entered the second phase of its strategy, that is, the interaction phase. 
Some evidences have suggested HTI has tried to establish interaction with 
government institutions, both at local and national government institution, 
through various means and activities. For instance, HTI activist actively 
approach local Indonesian military branches, such as in Bogor district 
or invited other key government elements to their activities, such as, in 
the opening ceremony of its office.43 Additionally, Muhtadi indicates that 
since 2003 many HTI activists have joined Muhammadiyah after leading 
conservative figure, Din Syamsudin, took the organisation leadership. 
Furthermore, HTI has also managed to infiltrate to Indonesian Islamic 
Scholars Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), in which one of the 
prominent members, Al-Khaththath, held a key position in the council.44 
The most recent compelling evidence was HTI activist speech that provokes 
military to take power from the government.45
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Vento Saudale, “Ini Jawaban Bima Arya Terkait Peresmian Kantor HTI” [Bima Arya Responses to HTI’s Office 
Opening Ceremony], Berita Satu, 11 Februari 2016, http://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/348691-ini-jawaban-
bima-arya-terkait-peresmian-kantor-hti.html. See also  Wisnu G and Amir, “Dandim Terima Kunjungan Silturahmi 
Pengurus DPD 2 HTI Kota Bogor” [Bogor Military Commander Accepts HTI Courtesy Call], Bogorplus, 2 October 
2013, 2018 http://bogorplus.com/index.php/bogor-raya/item/1916-dandim-terima-kunjungan-silaturahmi-pengurus-
dpd-2-hti-kota-bogor
44 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, The Quest, 632.  
45 Editorial Team, “Deretan Kudeta oleh Hizbut Tahrir” [List of Hizbut Tahrir Coup de etat], Kumparan, 02 May 
2017, https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/deretan-upaya-kudeta-oleh-hizbut-tahrir.
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III. PANCASILA V. CALIPHATE’S IDEOLOGY 
This section examines the incompatibility of Pancasila as an ideology with 
Caliphate ideology offered by HTI. Based on the discussion in its previous 
section, it can be concluded that Pancasila and HTI’s caliphate ideology are 
two competing ideologies. The incompatibilities rest in three aspects: first, the 
pluralistic and inclusive nature of Pancasila ideology as opposed to monolithic 
and exclusive nature of HTI’s ideology. Second, Pancasila’s popular sovereignty 
as opposed to HTI’s God’s Sovereignty. Finally, the Indonesian nationalism as 
opposes to HTI’s trans-nationalism.
3.1. Incompatibility 1: Pancasila Inclusive Society versus Caliphate Exclusive 
Society 
One of the most problematic ideas of HTI’s ideology against Pancasila 
is located on the issue of HTI exclusivity. The exclusive nature of HTI’s 
caliphate ideology can be seen as a threat to Indonesian unity, even though 
it is far away from implementation. It sufficiently creates discontent within 
Indonesia society and threaten the unification of Indonesia.46  As discussed 
previously, the acceptance of Pancasila by a large majority of Indonesian 
as the accepted “imagined order” is due to the pluralistic, inclusive and 
anti-discrimination promises. The strong pluralistic, inclusive and anti-
discrimination commitment reflects in Indonesia motto of unity in diversity 
(Bhinneka Tunggal Ika). In the previous section, it has been explained 
the promise of pluralistic and anti-discrimination has been designed and 
reinforced throughout Indonesia modern history starting from BPUPKI 
decision to reject the seven words to the interpretation of Suharto’s Pancasila 
as outlined in the TAP MPR on Ekaprasetya Pancakarsa. The idea reflects 
throughout the pre-amendment of the Constitution of 1945, notably, the 
Article 29 of the Constitution of 1945 that guarantees freedom of religion 
without the stipulation of seven words and the Article 6 of the Constitution 
46 Ahmad Khadafi, “Hizbut Tahrir Vs “Pancasila” dan “NKRI””, Tirto, 05 May 2017, https://tirto.id/hizbut-tahrir-
indonesia-vs-pancasila-dan-nkri-cn5x. 
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of 1945 that stipulates that Indonesia President is native Indonesia without 
mention “Muslim” as its requirement. In recent amendment, to further 
enforce the inclusive character of Indonesia ideology, the native Indonesia 
stipulation was removed. Consequently, it allows for non-native Indonesia 
citizens, such as Chinese Indonesia, Arab Indonesia or any other mix 
background to become President if he/she was born in Indonesia and never 
accepted other nationality.47
In contrast, HTI’s Caliphate ideology promotes exclusivity that based on 
the religious identity. The discriminatory nature of HTI’s ideology can be 
found in HTI’s constitution. For instance, it limits non-Muslim participation 
in government, non-Muslim cannot be elected as rulers, nor he/she can vote 
for a ruler or served as judges.48 Furthermore, HTI’s ideology also discriminates 
women. It limits women in domestic affairs and forbids women to take any 
official positions.49
3.2. Incompatibility 2: Pancasila’s Popular Sovereignty versus Caliphate’s 
God Sovereignty
As an ideology, Pancasila legitimacy is based on popular endorsement. 
It is the people who hold the sovereignty. Thus, any government form under 
Pancasila ideology is elected by the people and accountable to the people. 
This idea reflects in the fourth pillar of Pancasila that stipulates “the people 
governed by wise policies through a process of consultation and consensus.” 
Furthermore, the people sovereignty also explicitly affirms in Article 1 par. (2) 
of the pre-Amendment Constitution of 1945; it stipulates that “the sovereignty 
is on the hand of people and is implemented fully by MPR”. The decision-
making process in MPR is done through the majority vote.50 The people’s 
sovereignty is also still accommodated in the Amendment Constitution of 
1945 with some changes. The Article 1 par. (2) of the Amendment Constitution 
of 1945 stipulates the sovereignty is within the people and implemented 
47 Article 6 Constitution of 1945 Third Amendment. 
48 Hizb U Tahrir, The Draft Constitution, Article 67.
49 Ibid, Article 111. 
50  Article 2 Par.3 Pre-Amendment Constitution of 1945 (Republic of Indonesia). 
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based on the constitution. The revision aims to the acknowledgement that 
democracy needs to go hand in hand with rule of law. For HTI, democracy 
and people’s sovereignty are a kufar (unbeliever) system that replaces God 
as the highest will (yamlik al-iradah). Thus, the adoption itself is considered 
as forbidden (haram). HTI asserts that human should be governed by the 
divine rules that adopted by the Caliphate. In HTI concept, law does not 
need people endorsement. It is obvious that HTI’s ideology is incompatible 
with the fourth pillar of Pancasila. The idea to replace people sovereignty 
with God sovereignty is not only subversive, but also abolished the essence of 
Indonesian government as a Republic, in which the legitimacy of government 
based on the people approval.51
3.3. Incompatibility 3: Pancasila’s Nation State v. Caliphate’s Trans-
nationalism 
The third incompatibility between Pancasila and Caliphate’s ideology 
is on the issues of nationalism and nation state. As an ideology, Pancasila 
puts nationalism as one of its pillars. It explicitly contains in the third pillar 
of Pancasila, the unity of Indonesia. The nation state and nationalism has 
always been the foundation of Indonesia republic. On 1 June 1945, Sukarno 
gave speech that urged BPUPKI members to establish Indonesia nation 
state based on nationalism.52 Sukarno then continued to define a nation, 
by citing Ernest Renan, as a unit based on the share of fate.53 For HTI, the 
idea of nationalism is similar to that democracy as un-Islamic and jahil. HTI 
sees nationalism and nation state as its manifestation as part of a western 
conspiracy to undermine the unity of umma. Interestingly, HTI accuses Ernest 
Renan, the same person that Sukarno quote to define nationalism, deliberately 
conceptualised nationalism that subsequently led to the emergence of a 
nation-state. For HTI, Renan assertion of nationalism had contributed to the 
collapse of Ottoman Empire.54 Furthermore, HTI’s trans-nationalism ideology 
51 Article 1 Par.1 Pre-Amendment Constitution of 1945 (Republic of Indonesia). 
52 Saafroedin Bahar, et.al, eds., Risalah Sidang, 71.
53 Ibid., 72.
54 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, The Quest, 633.
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subdues Indonesia as a nation to those of Arab identity. This repression 
is evidence of the use of Arabic as HTI’s official organisational language.55 
For Indonesian, “Bahasa” is a national identity that signifies Indonesian 
nationalism. In conclusion, HTI ideology is incompatible with Indonesia’s 
Pancasila ideology. The successful of HTI movement in advancing its idea 
would eventually threaten Indonesia existence as a nation and its promise 
for the pluralistic society. Therefore, the government concern over HTI as 
an organisation is reasonably justified.
IV. LIMITING HTI’S FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
In the previous section, it has been argued that HTI’s ideology is against 
Pancasila. Thus, if it prevails, it will subsequently put an end not only Pancasila 
but also Indonesia as a nation-state. Therefore, there is a reasonable justification 
for the government to limit the development of HTI in Indonesia. The extent to 
which the government can limit HTI is bound by the Constitution of 1945. This 
section evaluates the current government measures in limiting HTI’s freedom of 
association and evaluates the action through the proportionality test interpretation 
of the limitation clause.  
4.1. Government Measures
After the surge of political Islam in recent Jakarta gubernatorial election, 
Joko Widodo has decided to take affirm measures to the phenomena. Joko 
Widodo considered the political Islam phenomena in the election as the 
awakening of radical Islamist to the center stage of Indonesian politic that 
threaten the unity of the nation.56 To reduce the political tension caused 
by political Islam, he creates policy that aims to weaken Islamic hard line 
societal organisation. One of those societal organisations is HTI. In a press 
conference, Coordinating Minister for Political, Law and Security Affairs, 
Wiranto, cited HTI’s ideology does not compatible with the 1945 Constitution 
and Law Number 17 year 2013 on Societal Organisations as a reason for the 
55 Hizb U Tahrir, The Draft Constitution, Article 8.
56 Mawa Kresna, “Pilkada Jakarta Berujung Pemberangusan HTI” [Jakarta Election Resulted in HTI’s Dissolution], 
Tirto, 12 May 2017,  https://tirto.id/pilkada-dki-jakarta-berujung-pemberangusan-hti-coxH.
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dissolution.57 However, the Law has a limitation. One of the limitation is a 
complicated procedure.58
Furthermore, further analyses on the Law reveals that government 
cannot dissolve HTI. The reason for this is because the Law stipulates 
strict requirement and procedure to act against societal organisation. The 
government can only give sanctions to societal organisation, if it violates 
Article 59 of the Law.  Article 59 outlines several prohibitions for societal 
organisation. Based on Government account, HTI potentially violates Article 
59(2)c and (4) of the Law. Article 59(2)c stipulates that an organisation 
prohibits to conduct any separation movement that threatens the territorial 
integrity of Indonesia. As Article 59(4) stipulates that societal organisation 
is forbidden to adopt, develop, and disseminate other ideology/teaching that 
against Pancasila. From the two articles, HTI activity cannot be categorized 
in both prohibitions. First, it is difficult for HTI to categorise violating Article 
59(2)c since HTI does not advocate separation of any part of Indonesia 
territory. Secondly, even if HTI caliphate ideology is against Pancasila, but 
according to the societal organization law, caliphate ideology or any other 
ideology apart from communism does not consider as against Pancasila. The 
explanatory memorandum of Article 59 (4) only stipulates that the ideology 
refers to the article is marxism, communism, and atheism.
Furthermore, HTI in its activities is known for adopting peaceful means 
in disseminating their idea. There are no records that HTI uses any violence, 
threaten security or disturb public order in doing their activities.59 The 
government realizes this hindrance, hence on July 2017, the government 
passed Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 2 Year 2017 on 
Amendment of Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (hereafter, 
57 Kristian Erdianto, “Ini Alasan Pemerintah Bubarkan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia” [Government’s Reason in Disbanding 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia], Kompas.com, 08 May 2017, http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/05/08/14382891/ini.
alasan.pemerintah.bubarkan.hizbut.tahrir.indonesia.
58 Kristian Erdianto, “Wiranto Sebut Pembubaran HTI Pakai Perppu Tak Langgar Prosedur Hukum” (Wiranto 
Claimed Using Perppu To Dissolve HTI Does Not Violate the Law), Kompas.com, 17 May 2017, http://nasional.
kompas.com/read/2017/05/17/18402491/wiranto.sebut.pembubaran.hti.pakai.perppu.tak.langgar.prosedur.hukum. 
See also  Eryanto Nugroho, “Can Hibut Tahrir really be dissolved ?”, Indonesiatmelbourne (blog), June 2, 2017, 
http://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/can-hizbut-tahrir-really-be-dissolved/.
59 Burhanuddin Muhtadi, The Quest, 624.
Proportionality Test in the 1945 Constitution: Limiting Hizbut Tahrir Freedom of Assembly
Constitutional Review, May 2018, Volume 4, Number 1 63
Perpu 2/2017). Perpu 2/2017 has several amendments that overcome the 
previous law obstacle in dissolving HTI. Those amendements are as follows: 
first, Perpu 2/2017 has added “Constitution of 1945” phrase in the definition 
of societal organisation. Second, it has broadened the prohibition clause in 
Article 59, namely :
a. Prohibiting to adopt flag or emblems that resembles the flag and emblems 
of Indonesia Republic as official organisation flags or emblems;
b. Expanding the definition of “group” to include government officials; and
c. Expanding the definition of Pancasila ideology to incorporate many 
non-communist ideologies including the Islamist ideologies (explanatory 
memorandum Article 2c).60
Third, Perpu 2/2017 removed all due process in sanctions procedures by 
removing the role of the court to review the process before the government 
decided to apply the sanction.61 Finally, Perpu 2/2017 has included criminal 
sanction. The penal sanction criminalizes every societal organisation member 
directly or indirectly involves any offences in prohibitory clauses. The 
maximum penalty for offences such as promoting and advocating activities 
that against Pancasila is punishable up to 20 years imprisonment.62 On 24 
October 2017, the Parliament approved Perpu 2/2017 to become Law. Perpu 
2/2017 has, then, become Law Number 16 Year 2017. 
4.2. Government Measures and Proportionality Test 
There is no doubt that human rights or any other legal rights always 
have its limitation. The idea reflects in an English maxim, “you right to 
swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.” This maxim 
indicates that the claim of individual rights ends when other personal rights 
exist. Article 29 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) stipulates 
clearly the possibility to limit human rights. The article stipulates: 
60 Explanatory Memorandum of Article 59 par. (4) letter c via Article 1 number 2 Government Regulation in Lieu 
Number 2 Year 2017 on Amendment of Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Indonesia).
61 Article 62 via Article 1 number 5 Government Regulation in Lieu Number 2 Year 2017 on Amendment of Law 
Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
62 Article 82 A via Article 1 number 5 Government Regulation in Lieu Number 2 Year 2017 on Amendment of Law 
Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
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“the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are determined by law solely for securing due recognition 
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the 
just requirements of morality, public order, and the general welfare in a 
democratic society”.
The Constitution of 1945 limitation clause has a similar tone with the Article 
29 UDHR. The Constitution of 1945 limitation clause stipulates: 
“In exercising rights and freedoms, every person shall be subject to limitation 
as are determined by law solely for securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of other and of meeting the just requirements 
of morality, religious values, security, public order, in a democratic society” 
Indonesia Constitutional Court affirms the limitation of human rights. In 
its Decision Number 14/PUU-VI/2008, MK considers the limitation of rights as 
inevitably, even without the limitation clauses stipulates in the 1945 Constitution.63
Nonetheless, the state power to limit human rights is without no limit. 
One of the prominent documents that extensively discuss this issue is Syracuse 
Principle developed by the American Association for the International Commission 
of Jurists (AAICJ). The introductory note to Syracuse Principle highlighted the 
abuse by many governments in using human rights limitation clause to arbitrary 
limit human rights. Thus, the AAICJ developed nine principles in which state 
can limit human rights under the human rights limitation clause.64 The principle 
emphasizes the “necessary”65 aspect in limiting the rights. The “necessary” wording 
implies that the limitation, among others, the need to be proportionate to the 
aim of limitation.66 Another important document is Human Rights Commission 
General Comments No. 31 of 2004 that stipulates the state restriction to any 
rights under International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) “must 
demonstrate their necessity and only take such measures as are proportionate 
63 Indonesia Republic Constitutional Court Decision Number 14/PUU-VI/2008 on Judicial Review Article 310 par. (1) 
and (2), Article 311 Par.(1), Article 316 and Article 207 Indonesia Criminal Court with respect to Constitution of 
1945 (Republic of Indonesia), p.278 – 279.
64 Ibid.
65  Article 12 Par. 3 International Covenant on Civil and Political and Rights (UN Treaty).
66 American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, “The Siracusa Principle on The Limitation and 
Derogation Provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly 7, No.1, 
(1985), 3-14.
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[emphasis added] to the pursuance of legitimate aims to ensure the continued 
and effective protection of Covenant rights.”67
Likewise, the limitation clause in the Constitution of 1945 also gives similar 
account for the state in limiting rights. The limitation clause outlines two 
aspects of state power in limit the human rights, namely, the procedural limit 
and substantive limit. The procedural limit requires that the human rights 
limitation should be prescribed by law. In Indonesian legal system, law is a type 
of regulation that needs to be approved by the Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, DPR).68 The substantive limit relates to the government reason to limit 
human rights. The limitation clause prescribes the basis for limitation that is 
strictly for the protection of other human rights, the just demand of morality, 
religious values, security and public order in a democratic society. From that 
arrangement, the question arises how to create a balance between the need for 
government to limit rights and the protection of its rights itself. The answer 
is rests on the wording of “in a democratic society”. The democratic society 
phrase is important to differentiate limitation between those of a totalitarian 
society (closed society) with limitation within a democratic society. This phrase 
encourages to conduct comparative research in order to see other jurisdiction 
applying the limitation clause. One of the most widely used as an approach to 
limit right in a democratic society is proportionality test.  
In constitutional law studies, proportionality test has become a generic 
constitutional law that commonly used in democratic society to balance between 
rights and legal limitation of rights. The generic constitutional law defines as 
“a skeletal body of constitutional theory, practice, and doctrine that belongs 
uniquely to no particular jurisdiction.”69 The idea of the generic constitutional 
law indicates that if a theory, practice, and doctrine have been applied in the 
various jurisdictions, it then becomes a generic constitutional law. The test has 
been applied in much of civil law and common law countries. Furthermore, 
it also has been applied by human rights Court in regional level, such as, the 
67 Human Rights Committee, General Comments No.31 (2004) adopted 18th session (UN). 
68 Article 20 Par. (2) Constitution of 1945 (Republic of Indonesia).
69 David S Law, “Generic Constitutional Law”, Working Paper University of San Diego School of Law, (2004) : 7.
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European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
and the European Court of Justice.70 The idea behind proportionality test is 
to balance the means with the end-result. In balancing between means and 
the end-result, the means should be helpful, necessary, appropriate and most 
importantly, proportional.71 Bernhard Schlink gave an example of a disabled 
man that tries to defend his apples (property) from a child who steals his apple 
from the tree. The child disregards his shouting not to take his apple. The only 
means for him is to use a gun that he can reach to shoot the child down. In 
this example, Schlink elaborates that the means of shooting the child is effective 
and necessary to protect the man’s apples (property). However, to shoot a child 
for apples is considered as inappropriate or imbalanced because the life of the 
child is much precious than the value of a couple of apples.72 Schlink gave a 
concrete example of a German Federal Constitutional Court case. The Court 
faced a question of whether the state could extract a defendant’s cerebrospinal 
fluid to determine his/her mental capacity. The court decided that determining 
mental capacity was a legitimate goal. However, the court recognized that the 
pain and danger caused by the extraction. Thus, the court sees that the extraction 
only justifies in a serious case.73
In limiting freedom of association, Maina Kiai, a special rapporteur for 
Human Rights Council, presented a report to the Human Rights Council on 28th 
session of 21 May 2012. In his report, Kiai outlines several important aspects of 
freedom of association limitation. The report explains that the suspension and 
the involuntary dissolution of an association are the severest types of restrictions 
on freedom of association. Thus, it can only be applied when there is a “clear 
and imminent danger resulting in a flagrant violation of national law”. The 
suspension and dissolution “should be strictly proportional to the legitimate aim 
pursued and used only when softer measures would be insufficient”.74 Furthermore, 
70 Juan Coanciardo, “The Principle of Propotionality : The Challanges of Human Rights”, Journal of Civil law Studies 
3, (2010) : 178.
71 Berhnard Schlink, “Propotionality in Constitutional Law: Why Everywhere But Here?, Duke Journal pf Comparative 
& International Law 22, (2012) : 291 - 293.
72 Ibid.,  293.
73 Ibid.
74 Maina Kiai, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of Association. 
In: Rapporteur UNHRCS, editor. New York: United Nation General Assembly 2012, 18.
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Kiai highlighted that decision to dissolve an organization, especially labour 
organization, “should only occur in extremely serious cases, and it needs to be 
done through judicial decision so that the rights of defense are fully guaranteed”.75 
To evaluate the Law on Societal Organisation, it can be approached by classifying 
the law into two aspects of rights protection: the substantive rights protection 
and the procedural rights protection. The substantive rights protection refers to 
the action of Societal Organisation Law that can be sanctioned. In proportionality 
test, the action that can be sanctioned needs to be recognized by the relevant 
article of the Constitution of 1945. The procedural rights protection refers to the 
procedure in which government applying the sanction. It relates to proportionality 
of government sanction to the violation done by the societal organisation.
Arguably, the Law has partially complied with the parameter defined in the 
report and proportionality test interpretation on the limitation clause. The partial 
compliance is due to issues on the substantive rights protection. The Law contains 
prohibitory clause that prohibits societal organisation to affiliate with communism 
and marxism ideology. The Law stipulates several prohibit actions that would 
result in sanction, if societal organisation breach the prohibition clause.76 The 
sanctions are administrative sanction starting from notice of breach, revocation 
of grants, temporary dissolution, and to the severest punishment of permanent 
dissolution.77 In Article 59 (4) of the Law prohibits societal organisation to adopt 
communism as its ideological foundation. This arrangement violates the freedom 
of consciences that protects under Article 28E (2) of the 1945 Constitution. 
ICCPR explicitly categorized that the freedom of consciences as non-derogable 
rights.78 Apart from sanctioning communism, there are no substantial issues 
to the other prohibition clauses. The other prohibition clause includes societal 
organisation involvement in violence,79 advocating disintegration and involved 
in the separatist movement,80 instigating hatred, contempt on races, ethnicity, 
75 Ibid.
76 Article 59 Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
77 Article 60 Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
78 Article 4 Par.2 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (UN Treaty).
79 Article 59 par.2 Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
80 Article 59 par.2 letter a Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
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and religions,81 conducting vigilante actions,82 and involve in political party fund 
raising.83
In procedural protection aspect, the Law has sufficiently given protection 
to the freedom of association. The law guarantees the rights of defence through 
the involvement of court in imposing a sanction on societal organisation.84 This 
is an essential safeguard from freedom of association protection perspective 
as highlighted in Kiai report.85 Furthermore, the Law has put dissolution as a 
final measure, if any other measures have failed to prevent an organization to 
breach the prohibition clauses.86 This procedural process indicates the adoption 
of proportionality approach in limiting rights. The steps are the manifestation 
of the spectrum of sanctions that control government from arbitrarily giving the 
ultimate sanctions to societal organisation. 
The Law outlines three steps:  The first is to give written notice.87 The second 
step, if it continues to conduct the violations, the sanction increases to stop aiding 
and temporary termination.88 Finally, dissolution and termination declared by the 
court.89 Unfortunately, all those features have been removed by the amendment to 
the Law. The changes as adopt in the amended Law has breached the limitation 
clause from proportionality test perspective that requires proportionality between 
the government measures with the threat posed by the societal organisation. The 
enactment of the amended law is disproportionate because of three stipulations 
in the amendment law: first, it broadened definition that could potentially use 
to silence critics to government officials. Secondly, the removal of due process 
in societal organisation is sanctioning. Finally, it criminalizes the organisation 
members based on its membership of the organisation, if the organisation violates 
the prohibition clause. One of the prohibition clauses in the Law of 2013 is a 
prohibition for an organisation to conduct any sedition toward races, ethnicities, 
81 Article 59 par.2 letter c Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
82 Article 59 par.2 letter e Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
83 Article 59 par.3 Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
84 Article 60 – 82 Republic of Indonesia Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation
85 Miani Kai, Report of the Special. 
86 Article 61 Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
87 Article 62 Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
88 Article 64 Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
89 Article 70 Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
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and groups.90 The Law constructs the definition of races, ethnicities, and groups 
within the line of common understanding. In common understanding, those 
categories refer to the identity of a certain group of people that share a common 
attribute, such as, political, culture or physical attributes. The Amendment to the 
Law has broadened the definition of “groups” element to include state officials.91 
This provision can potentially be misused to stifle legitimate criticism to state 
officials. The protection of criticism to government officials is an essential part 
of freedom of expression.92 Furthermore, the sanction itself is disproportionate 
because it adds severe criminal sanction for the member of the societal 
organisation, if found guilty of violation to this prohibition clause. 
The second problem with the Amendment Law of 2017, it has removed all the 
procedural safeguards existed in the previous Law. The main important feature of 
societal organisation is a procedural safeguard that is the involvement of judiciary 
in the sanctioning process (ex-ante process). The societal amendment law shifted 
this approach to post-factum process. In post-factum process, the government 
dissolves the organisation first then the organisation can challenge the decision 
in the court. The shifted mechanism is a serious violation of the human rights 
principle, where in the severest punishment for rights, due process must be put 
in place before any government decision can be given. Finally, the most important 
objection to the Amendment Law is the criminal sanction. The formulation of 
criminal sanction is vague. It does not meet the standard and criteria of lex 
certa. Lex certa principle requires that criminal sanction need to be defined as 
accurate, specific and precises as possible. The definition of criminal actions in 
the law has failed the lex certa principle. It is notable in the use of “indirect 
involvement” category as a criminal element in the formulation of the criminal 
actions. Potentially, such formulation could result in the arbitrary punishment 
to a member of the organisation that leads to arbitrary mass prosecution to the 
member of the societal organisation. 
90 Article 59 par (1) letter a Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation  (Republic of Indonesia).
91 Article 59 par (3) letter a via Article 1 Number 2 Government Regulation in Lieu Number 2 Year 2017 on Amendment 
of Law Number 17 Year 2013 on Societal Organisation (Republic of Indonesia).
92 Reem Segev, “Freedom of Expression : Criticizing Public Officials,” Amsterdam Law Forum [Online],  Accessed 
March 20, 2018  http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/113/204.
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On July 2017, the government announced HTI dissolution. HTI dissolution 
is based on the Amendment Law.93 Arguably, the dissolution is potentially 
unlawful because it is based on law that its constitutionality is questionable. The 
enactment of the Law made Indonesia fall to the paradox democracy, in which 
the government uses undemocratic measures to constrain the development of 
anti-democracy political force. In a democratic society, the government ought to 
use democratic approach to limit rights that are to apply proportionality test in 
limiting freedom of association. The government concern to HTI movement is 
reasonable and justifiable. The application of proportionality test dictates that 
government response should be proportionated with HTI’s level of threat. Thus, 
the government needs to focus and assess HTI’s action and strategy. 
As it has been discussed above, HTI defines its strategy into three stages, in 
which HTI has entered the second stages. The second stage is interaction and 
infiltration stage where HTI’s activist interact and influence key government and 
societal organisation.94 This phenomenon has amplified the level of HTI threat. 
However, it has not significantly posed “clear and imminent danger” to apply the 
severest sanction that is the dissolution. Other administrative measures need 
to be conducted before it can be applied to dissolve HTI as an organisation, 
such as, limiting HTI activities to interact with key government institutions, 
or prohibiting HTI to accesses government support including prohibiting the 
use of public utilities for its activities. The severest form of limitation, such as, 
the permanent dissolution can only be done, if the government has substantial 
indication that HTI is about to enter its stage three, that is the revolution.
V. CONCLUSION 
HTI as political-ideological movement is, indeed, against Pancasila. The 
incompatibility between HTI’s ideology and Pancasila situates in three aspects: 
HTI’s exclusivity against Pancasila’s inclusivity; HTI’s God Soverignty against 
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Pancasila’s People Sovereignty; and HTI’s trans-nationalism against Pancasila 
nationalism (nation-state). All of the three aspects are important elements of 
Indonesia existence and integration. For instance, the inclusive character of 
Pancasila is based on agreement from Indonesian founders to establish a state that 
overcomes the primordial spirit of groups. Thus, the state should not be based on 
majority nor minority identity. This idea has become the Indonesian consensus 
that unified Indonesian. Any attempt to replace the consensus, especially, toward 
the more exclusive state would result in Indonesian disintegration. Furthermore, 
the trans-nationalism character of HTI’s ideology would result in the elimination 
of the most important essence of Indonesia as a state that is Indonesia nation 
(kebangsaan Indonesia). The HTI’s trans-nationalism ideology eliminate Indonesia 
nation identity under the domination of another foriegn identity that is the 
Arab through the imposition of Arab language as the official language of HTI’s 
state-to-be. The incompatibility of HTI’s ideology and Pancasila is sufficient to 
raise justifiable concern for government to the danger of HTI’s movement.
Nonetheless, no matter how subversive HTI’s ideology to Pancasila, the 
government still cannot limit HTI’s rights solely based on its incompatibility 
to Pancasila, since HTI’s ideology at the level of ideas fall under freedom 
of conscience protection clause that cannot be derogated under ICCPR. The 
government action to limit HTI’s rights of association is justifiable if HTI has 
tried to impose its ideology through revolution. The limitation itself should be 
justified under the limitation clause of the 1945 Constitution. I concluded that 
the proportionality test application by the interpretation of the limitation clause 
of the 1945 Constitution is persuasive. This argument is based on the democratic 
society phrase of the limitation clause, in which many of today democratic society 
used the approach to interpret it.  
The proportionality test dictates that any action against freedom of association 
or any other rights limitation should be proportional. Thus, the limitation 
should be constructed within the spectrum of government measures. In the 
freedom of association context, the limitation should be initiated from minor 
administrative measure, such as, notification of breach up to the severest form 
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of limitation that is the dissolution. The dissolution should be used in the 
strictest form, in which there is “a clear and imminent danger resulting in a 
flagrant violation of national law.” The government measure at this point does 
not reflect the limitation clause of the 1945 Contitution. The Amendment Law of 
2017 reflected the use of totalitarian measures as opposed to democratic society 
measures. The application of proportionality test confirms the compatibility of 
the previous Law with the limitation clause but rejects the Amendment Law of 
2017. In HTI issues, at the current stage, the proportionality test interpretation 
requires that government can limit HTI’s freedom of association by imposing 
some restriction in their activities, such as prohibiting the use of public facilities 
to their activities, prohibiting interaction and cooperation between HTI and key 
political and government institutions. Additionally, the severest restriction of 
HTI’s dissolution can only be applied if there is a strong indication of HTI is 
entering its final stage, the revolution. 
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